IN THE ITAT
Vodithala
Education Society
v.
Assistant
Director of Income-tax (Exemptions) II,
Pradeep Parikh, Vice
President
And N.R.S. Ganesan, Judicial Member
It Appeal No. 1138
(Hyd.) of 2006
[Assessment year
2003-04]
October 31, 2007
Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 -
Charitable purpose - Assessment year 2003-04 - Whether education would remain
as a charity only in a case where education is imparted systematically for a
fee prescribed by Government - Held, yes - Whether a private aided or unaided
professional institution or any other educational institution of a State is
required to collect fees with regard to infrastructure and benefit of students
of that educational institution - Held, yes - Whether, however, such fees has
to be fixed by Committee headed by a retired High Court Judge as directed by
Apex Court in Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka [2003] 6 SCC
697 - Held, yes - Whether collection of money over and above fee prescribed by
Committee would amount to collection of capitation fee and such an institution
would face legal consequences for same - Held, yes - Whether receiving
donations by educational institutions connected with admission of students is
to be treated as collection of capitation fees - Held, yes - Assessee-society
was running an educational institution and hostels - For relevant assessment
year, it filed return claiming exemption under section 11 - There was a survey
operation in premises of one of colleges run by assessee, wherein several
incriminating materials were seized disclosing collection of money over and
above prescribed fee from students - Assessing Officer, therefore, disallowed
exemption under section 11 - Whether since assessee had collected money over
and above prescribed by concerned authority for admission of student, such an
amount was to be classified as capitation fee and it could be said that
assessee’s case was a clear case of sale of education by assessee and,
therefore, it could not be considered as charitable institution under section
2(15) - Held, yes
Section 10(23C) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 - Charitable/religious institutions - Assessment year
2003-04 - Whether for purpose of claiming exemption under section 10(23C)(vi), university
or other educational institution, has to get approval of prescribed authority
and in absence of such approval from prescribed authority, such an institution
would not be entitled to any exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) - Held, yes
Section 143, read with
section 10(23C), of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Assessment - General -
Assessment year 2003-04 - Whether Assessing Officer may pass an order under
section 143(3) without giving effect to provisions of section 10, provided he
informs prescribed authority/Central Government as the case may be and approval
granted earlier to university college or other institution is withdrawn or
rescinded - Held, yes - Whether in a case where no approval is granted by
prescribed authority earlier to such an institution, there is no need for
Assessing Officer to intimate to prescribed authority before passing assessment
order under section 143(3) - Held, yes
per
tribunal
Collection of money
over and above the fees prescribed by the Committee appointed as per the directions
of the
Facts
The assessee-society was
running educational institutions and hostels, in the States of Andhra Pradesh
and Maharashtra. For the assessment year 2003-04, the assessee filed return
claiming exemption under section 11. There was a survey operation in the
premises of one of the colleges run by the assessee from where several
incriminating materials were seized which revealed collection of money over and
above the prescribed fee from the students under the management quota, and one
of the employees, i.e., ‘R’ of the said institution was examined during
the course of survey. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee initially
applied for approval of the prescribed authority for exemption as provided in
section 10(23C)(vi), but the same was rejected. When the same was
brought to the notice of the assessee by the Assessing Officer, the assessee
claimed that it had the option to choose between two exemptions, viz.,
section 10(23C)(vi) and section 11, therefore, the assessee claimed
exemption under section 11. However, the Assessing Officer found that such a choice
was not available to the assessee, and section 11 does not authorize deduction
from total income and as the assessee was collecting money over and above the
fee prescribed by Government, it could not be treated as charitable institution
and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to any exemption under section
11. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) found that since there was violation
of the provisions of section 13(1)(c) by utilizing the funds of the
society by the persons interested, the assessee was not entitled to any
exemption under section 11.
On second appeal, the
assessee contended that the income derived by the assessee from other
educational institutions was not considered by the Assessing Officer; when the
assessee specifically claimed exemption under section 11, the Assessing Officer
ought not to have considered the claim under section 10(23C); and that
opportunity of cross-examination of abovesaid employee was not given to the
assessee.
Held
Applicability
of section 11
Section 11 provides for
exemption of income from the total income from the property held under trust
for charitable or religious purpose. For the purpose of claiming exemption
under section 11, the assessee has to make an application under section 12A for
registration. One of the prerequisites for making such application under
section 12A is that the assessee should be a religious or charitable
institution or trust. Admittedly, the main activity of the assessee-society was
to run educational institutions. The Legislature in their wisdom enacted
sections 10(23C)(iiiab),
10(23C)(iiiad) and 10(23C)(vi) for grant of exemption of income
in respect of universities or institutions, which exist solely for education purpose
and not for profit. From the material place on record, it appeared that the
assessee filed an application before the concerned authority for registration
under section 12A, and the same was granted with effect from 1-4-2001. [Para 6]
It was to be examined
that whether the assessee-society was a charitable institution or not.
Charitable purpose has been defined by the Legislature in section 2(15). As per said section the charitable
purpose includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief and the
advancement of any other object of general public utility. [Para 7]
From the above, it is
obvious that ‘education’ is included in the charitable purpose. Admittedly, the
assessee-society was running educational institutions. The next question that
fell for consideration was when an assessee collected money over and above the
fees prescribed by the Government, whether it constituted a charitable
institution or not. The Apex Court in Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka [1992] 2 SCC 666
considered the issue of capitation fee collected by the private educational
institutions. It was held in that case that capitation fee is nothing but a
price for selling education. The concept of ‘teaching shop’ is contrary to the
constitutional scheme and is wholly abhorrent to Indian culture and heritage.
Some of the State Legislatures passed legislation prohibiting the collection of
capitation fee and also made the same a punishable offence. [Para 7]
The Apex Court in Islamic Academy of Education v. State of
Karnataka [2003] 6 SCC 697 directed all the State Governments to constitute
a committee headed by a retired High Court Judge for prescribing fee structure
for professional colleges. The Apex Court further held that if any amount is
charged other than the fee prescribed by the Committee under any head or guise,
the same would amount to capitation fee. Therefore, collection of money over
and above the fee prescribed by the committee would amount to collection of
capitation fee. [Para 8]
In the instant case,
collection of capitation fee was contrary to the constitutional scheme and
prohibited by State enactment. Moreover, education was used as an
apparatus/mode to collect capitation fee. In other words, exorbitant money was
collected illegally in the guise of running the educational institution. When
the assessee used the charitable activity/educational institution as an
apparatus for selling the education, the element of charity no longer remained
in the activity of the assessee. In other words, when the assessee sold the seat
of a professional course and collected capitation fee, the activity of assessee
could not remain a charitable activity, within the meaning of section 2(15). Education would remain as a charity
only in a case where the education is imparted systematically for a fee
prescribed by the Government. It is not the intention of the Parliament to
recognize any body/society or institution as a charitable institution where
‘education’ is a saleable commodity. In the instant case, the material found
during the course of survey operation clearly established the collection of
money over and above the fee prescribed by the Government for admission of a
student. Therefore, it was a clear case of sale of education by the
assessee-society. Thus, the assessee could not be considered as a charitable
institution under section 2(15). Therefore, the assessee was not
eligible for exemption under section 11. [Para 9]
Any income derived from
the property held under trust for charitable purpose, should not be included in
the total income. In the instant case, admittedly, the assessee was not holding
any property under trust for charitable purpose. It was also not the case of
the assessee that any income was derived from the property held under trust for
charitable purpose. Moreover, it was also not the case of the assessee that any
income in the form of voluntary contributions was received with a specific
direction to form part of the corpus of the society. The assessee-society was
running educational institution and deriving income from such institution. The
assessee had also collected money over and above the fees prescribed for
admitting students under management quota. In other words, the educational
institution was used as a tool/apparatus for collecting money over and above the
fees prescribed. The assessee-society had no other source of income/receipt.
The society owned the educational institution. The Legislature has visualized
two situations. One is religious and another is charitable. Section 11 provides
for exemption in respect of income derived from property held under trust for
charitable and religious purpose. ‘Education’ falls within the definition of
charitable purpose. Therefore, any income derived from property held under
trust for charitable purpose and applied for education, is eligible for
exemption under section 11. In the instant case, admittedly, the assessee had
not derived any income from any property held under trust. The only source of
receipt was the education itself, i.e., from educational institution. [Para 11]
The next question that
fell for consideration was whether the educational institution owned by the
assessee-society would be regarded as a property held under trust by the
society. Section 11 speaks of the property held under trust. The Legislature visualized
two situations. One is income derived from the property held under trust and
another is application of that income derived from the property held under
trust for a charitable purpose. Therefore, there is a clear distinction between
the property held under trust and the charitable activity. In the instant case,
the assessee-society was carrying on charitable activity by establishing
educational institution. Therefore, the charitable activity of the assessee was
education. The income, if any, derived from the property held under the Trust
and applied for the educational activity, would be construed as application of
income for the purpose of charitable purpose. Therefore, the expenditure
incurred in establishing the educational institution, namely, acquisition of
land, construction of building, etc., are all application of income for
charitable activity. If any income was generated in the course of educational
activity, the said income would be construed as if it was generated in the
course of carrying on the charitable activity. Therefore, such receipt/income
received in the course of carrying on charitable activity was also eligible for
exemption, provided the same was applied or set apart for educational purposes.
However, such receipt/income cannot be construed as derived from
property/business held under trust. Since such receipt/income is inevitable or
consequential while carrying on the activity of education, such income also
becomes eligible for exemption. The educational institution is an apparatus for
carrying out the charitable activity. Therefore, the educational institution or
charitable activity itself cannot be construed as the property held under
trust. The establishment of an educational institution is an activity of
charity. Therefore, by any stretch of imagination, the charitable activity,
cannot be held as the property held under trust, even though the income/receipt
incidental to such activity is eligible for exemption. However, the money
collected over and above the prescribed fee for admitting students cannot be
construed as income derived from/incidental to the activity of carrying on
charitable activity. [Para 12]
It is a well-settled
principle of law that a business held under a trust is also a property. Section
11(4) also makes it very clear that the property held under the trust includes
a business undertaking. If the assessee-society runs a business incidental to
the attainment of the object of the society and separate books of account are
maintained by the assessee, the income derived from such business, shall be
treated as income derived from the property held under the trust. The Apex
Court in Asstt. CIT v. Thanthi
Trust [2001] 247 ITR 785/115 Taxman 126 considered the provisions of section
11(4A) and held that if the business income is derived from business held under
the trust and the same is utilized by the institution for achieving object of
the institution, then it could be said that such income is applied for
charitable purpose. The assessee-society in question had no property or
business whatsoever under trust. Moreover, it was not the claim of the assessee
that any income was derived from the property or business held under trust.
[Para 13]
The Kerala High Court
in Brahmin Educational
Society v. Asstt. CIT [1997] 227 ITR 317/[1996] 89 Taxman 434
considered a similar question and observed that section 11(4) cannot override
section 10(22). The language of section 10(22) is analogous with
provisions of sections 10(23C)(iiiab), 10(23C)(iiiad) and
10(23C)(vi). Therefore, the judgment of the Apex Court and other High
Courts in respect of section 10(22) is equally applicable to section
10(23C). When the Legislature enacted a specific provision for grant of
exemption of income in respect of educational institution under sections 10(23C)(iiiab),
10(23C)(iiiad) and 10(23C)(vi), the general provision contained
in section 11 may not override the provisions of specific section. In other
words, the income of the educational institution has to be examined under
sections 10(23C)(iiiab), 10(23C)(iiiad) and 10(23C)(vi)
and not under section 11. This view is further fortified by the judgment of the
Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Saraswati Poor Students Fund
[1984] 150 ITR 142/[1985] 20 Taxman 211. Even otherwise, the material available
on record, which was found during survey operation clearly showed the receipt
of money over and above the fees prescribed by the committee constituted by the
Government, for admitting the students under the Management Quota. The material
found during the course of survey operation, further established that the money
collected over and above the prescribed fee for admitting students was paid to
the Chairman and other interested persons of the society. Therefore, there was
a clear violation of the provisions of section 13(1)(c). Under section
13(1)(c), if any part of income of the institution is used or applied
directly/indirectly for the benefit of a person, i.e., the founder or
any interested person, as referred to in section 13(3), then the assessee shall
not be entitled to exemption under sections 11 and 12. Therefore, the assessee
was not entitled to exemption under section 11. [Para 14]
Applicability
of various clauses of section 10(23C)
Section 10(23C)(iiiab) refers to educational institution or
university, which is wholly or substantially financed by the Government. In the
instant case, the assessee-society, was not financed by the Government either
wholly or substantially and, therefore, the provisions of section 10(23C)(iiiab)
were not applicable. It was to be seen further that whether the
assessee-society would fall under section 10(23C)(iiiad). Section
10(23C)(iiiad) would be applicable in a case where the assessee’s annual
receipts do not exceed Rs. 1 crore. In the instant case, the assessee’s annual
receipt admittedly exceeded Rs. 1 crore. Therefore, the provisions of section
10(23C)(iiiad) were also not applicable. Now what remained was section
10(23C)(vi) which provides for exemption of income of any university or
other educational institutions existing solely for educational purposes and not
for profit. In the instant case, the assessee-society was admittedly not an
university. However, the assessee-society was running educational institutions
and receiving income from such institutions. [Para 15]
It was to be seen
further that when a society which runs/owns an educational institution, whether
such society itself would be regarded as ‘other educational institutions’. The
Apex Court examined this issue in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution v. Addl.
CIT [1997] 224 ITR 310/90 Taxman 528. In that case, the assessee-society was
running the educational institution. The Administrative Commissioner held that
section 10(22) is applicable to the educational institution and not to any one
who might be financing and running the said institution. However, the Apex
Court held that since the society came into existence to impart education, such
educational society should be regarded as an educational institution.
Therefore, it was obvious that the assessee-society would fall within the term
‘other educational institution’. [Para 16]
For the purpose of
claiming exemption under section 10(23C)(vi), the university or the other educational institution, has to get
the approval of the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority, is the
Chief Commissioner or the Director General of Income-tax. The purpose of
designating the senior most officers of the Income-tax Department, as
Prescribed Authority, clearly shows that, before granting approval, a thorough
examination has to be done and found out whether the assessee-society is
existing solely for educational activity and not for profit. In the instant
case, as seen from the assessment order, the prescribed authority, rejected the
application made by the assessee for approval. It was also not the case of the
assessee that the necessary approval was obtained from the prescribed
authority. In the absence of such approval from the prescribed authority, the
assessee was not entitled to any exemption under section 10(23C)(vi). [Para
17]
Further more, the
assessee had to establish that the running of educational institutions was not
for the purpose of profit. The assessee had no independent source of income
other than the income from the educational institutions. During the course of
survey, admittedly, the revenue authorities found incriminating material which
showed the collection of exorbitant amounts from the students, who were
admitted under the management quota. ‘R’ who was examined in the course of
survey proceedings admitted that the money collected from the students who were
admitted under management quota was the concealed income of society. He also
further stated that the monies collected under the management quota were handed
over to the chairman and other persons interested in the society. However, ‘R’
was not cross-examined by the assessee. The Assessing Officer had placed
reliance upon the totality of the material seized during the course of survey
operations and not only on the statement recorded during the course of survey
from ‘R’. Even otherwise, as held by the Madras High Court in T. Devasahaya Nadar v. CIT [1964] 51
ITR 20, it cannot be said as a general proposition of law that any evidence
upon which the department might rely upon should have been subjected to cross-examination.
In the instant case, the statement of ‘R’ was already brought to the notice of
the assessee. Even otherwise the statement received from ‘R’ was ignored, the
material found during the course of survey operation clearly showed that the
assessee-society collected money over and above the fees prescribed by the
Government for admitting the students under the management quota. With that
background, it was to be examined whether the collection of the money over and
above fees prescribed by the Government from the student or their parents for
admitting under the management quota would have any profit motive or not. [Para
18]
Under article 41 of the
Constitution, the responsibility of the State is to provide education to all
citizens of the country. The State may discharge its obligation through State
owned or State recognized educational institutions. When State/Central
Government grants recognition to the private educational institutions, it
creates an agency to fulfil its obligation under the Constitution. Therefore,
the private institutions are functioning as agents of the State/Central
Government. It is the primary responsibility and obligation of the State to
provide education to the citizens. Therefore, the educational institutions
while acting as agents of the State have to collect the fees as prescribed by
the Government. The students are given admission to the private educational
institutions in recognition of their ‘right to education’ under the
Constitution. Therefore, charging of any amount over and above the fee
prescribed by Government, either as capitation fee or otherwise, in
consideration of admission to educational institution, is a patent denial of a
citizen’s right to education under the Constitution. Education is in the
concurrent list of the Constitution. Therefore, both the Central and the State
Governments are competent to enact law with regard to education. In other
words, it is the responsibility/obligation of both the Central and the State
Governments to provide education to all the citizens of the country. Despite
various cultural and linguistic differences, India is united because of
tolerance and piousness of the people. Education is considered to be pious in
the country. Ancient days ‘Gurukulams’ were established to impart knowledge to
people. Due to efflux of time and civilization, the earlier ‘Gurukulams’ are
now called as schools and colleges. In other words, it is known as educational
institutions. However, the Indian civilization continues to recognize education
as one of the pious obligation of the human society. When the people of the
country considered education as a pious one, it cannot be made as a saleable
commodity in the guise of encouraging private institution to support the State
in the process of establishing educational institutions. To establish and
administer educational institutions, are considered to be a charitable object.
The way in which the exorbitant amounts were collected by the assessee-society
for admission under the management quota, showed that they were not
administering the educational institutions for pious and charitable purpose,
but with a profit motive. When an assessee sells the seat of the professional
course in a college and collects money, it can be said that there is profit
motive involved in it. When the assessee collects money over and above the fees
prescribed by the Government, it clearly exposes the intention of the assessee
to earn profit. It is also to be remembered that collection of capitation fees
for admission to any educational institution is made an offence punishable in
the country. In spite of that, the assessee was bold enough in collecting the
money over and above the fees prescribed by the Government. [Para 19]
The Apex Court in the
case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation
v. State of Karnataka [2002] 8 SCC 481 had an occasion to consider the
right of the aided and unaided private educational institutions. The
Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court elaborately considered the right of
establishing private educational institutions and found that collection of
capitation fees during the worst part of mal-administration, can properly be
the subject-matter of regulatory control of a State. The Apex Court further
observed that receiving donations by educational institutions connected with
admission of students is to be treated as collection of capitation fees. The
Apex Court observed that the right to admit students being an essential facet
of the right to administer educational institutions of their choice, the State
Government/University may not be entitled to interfere with their right so long
as the admission to the unaided educational institution is on a transparent
basis and merit is adequately taken care of. It was also observed that the
unaided institutions cannot be regulated with regard to charging of fees,
however, such institution shall not charge capitation fees. This judgment was
considered by another Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Islamic
Academy of Education (supra). The majority judges of the Apex Court
after considering the judgment in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra),
observed that there can be no fixing of rigid fee structure by the Government.
Each institute must have the freedom to fix its own fee structure, taking into consideration
the need to generate funds to run the institution and to provide facilities
necessary for the benefit of the students. The educational institutions must
also be able to generate surplus which must be used for the betterment and
growth of that educational institution. It was further observed that the
surplus funds generated by educational institutions cannot be diverted for any
other use or purpose and cannot be used for personal gain or for any other
business or enterprise. The Apex Court further directed all the State
Governments and concerned authorities to set up a committee headed by a retired
High Court Judge who shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court.
[Para 20]
From the above
observation of the Apex Court, it is obvious that each institute has to collect
fees with regard to infrastructure and benefit of students of that educational
institution. However, that fee has to be fixed by the committee headed by a
retired High Court Judge. In the State of Andhra Pradesh, a committee has
already been constituted to determine the fees that may be collected by the
private professional educational institutions. The committee also after
considering the information furnished by the respective educational
institutions fixed the fees that may be collected by the professional
educational institution per semester/year. Therefore, an assessee had to
collect the fees that were prescribed by the Committee headed by Retired Judge
of the High Court. The money that is collected by the assessee either directly
or indirectly over and above the amount fixed as fees by the committee has to
be treated as collection and charging of capitation fees and the assessee has
to face the further consequence in accordance with law including losing of its
recognition/affiliation. Moreover, if the assessee feels that any particular
student may leave the institution in mid stream, then at the best, it may
require that student to give a bond/bank guarantee that the balance fees for
the whole course would be received by the institute even if the student left in
mid stream. In case, the assessee collected the fees for entire course in
advance, only the fees of that semester/year can be used by the institution.
The balance fees must be kept invested in fixed deposits in a nationalised
bank. The interest earned on such deposit must be paid to the student from whom
the fees was collected in advance. In the instant case, the assessee even
though claimed that the fees for the entire 4 years was collected, the same was
not deposited/invested in any bank as per the direction of the Apex Court. In
fact, the entire money was utilized by the persons interested in the society.
Therefore, there was a clear case of misuse of funds of the institution,
besides, collecting money over and above the fees prescribed for the semester
indirectly, which amounted to collection of capitation fees as held by the Apex
Court. Therefore, the assessee-society did not exist solely for educational
purpose, but existed only for profit. [Para 20]
Further, also in view
of the observation of the Apex Court in P.A. Mandal v. State of Maharashtra [2005] 6 SCC 537, it is
obvious that a private aided or unaided professional educational institution or
any other educational institution of State is required to collect the fees
fixed by the committee, as directed by the Apex Court. The committee in the
State of Andhra Pradesh had already fixed the fees for the respective colleges.
Therefore, any amount received by the assessee over and above fee fixed by the
committees had to be classified as capitation fees and the institution would
face the legal consequences, in other words, the assessee existed for profit
and not solely for educational purpose. Since the assessee had not obtained the
approval of the prescribed authority as required under section 10(23C)(vi)
and it also existed for profit and not solely for educational purpose, the
assessee was not entitled to exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) also.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Applicability
of provision of section 143(3)
Under section 143(3),
the Government and the prescribed authorities are required to be informed
before passing any order without giving effect to the provisions of section 10.
[Para 23]
As per first proviso to
section 143(3), the Assessing Officer may pass an order without giving effect
to the provisions of section 10(23C), provided he informs the prescribed
authority/Central Government as the case may be and the approval granted
earlier is withdrawn or rescinded. In the instant case, it was not the case of
the assessee that any approval was obtained from prescribed authority. In fact,
as seen from the assessment order, the prescribed authority rejected the
application of the assessee for approval. The question of intimating the
prescribed authority and waiting for withdrawal of approval may be necessary in
a case where approval was granted earlier. Since no approval was granted by
prescribed authority earlier, there was no need for the Assessing Officer to
intimate to the prescribed authority before passing the assessment order,
without giving effect to the provisions of section 10(23C)(vi). [Paras 23 and 24]
Computation
of income
The other contention of
the assessee was that the Assessing Officer had taken the income of the one
college for computation in the assessment order. The revenue also conceded that
the Assessing Officer had taken only the income of one college and therefore,
the Assessing Officer might be asked to verify the income of other educational
institutions run by the assessee. In view of the above submission of the
assessee and the revenue, the Assessing Officer might verify the income of the
other educational institutions run by the assessee-society and the Assessing
Officer would be at liberty to rectify the computation of income in the assessment
order under section 154. The confirmation of the assessment order by the
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal could not be treated as a bar for
verifying income of the other educational institution and rectifying the
computation of the assessment order. In other words, the Assessing Officer was
at liberty to rectify the computation of income alone in the assessment order.
[Para 25]
In view of the above
discussion, there was no merit in the appeal of the assessee, accordingly, the
same was to be dismissed.
Case
Review
Brahmin Educational
Society v. Asstt. CIT
[1997] 227 ITR 317/[1996] 89 Taxman 434 (para 14); CIT v. Saraswati
Poor Students Fund [1984] 150 ITR 142/[1985] 20 Taxman 211 (para 14); Aditanar
Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT [1997] 224 ITR 310/90 Taxman
528 (SC) (para 16); T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka
[2002] 8 SCC 481 (para 20) and Islamic Academy of Education v. State
of Karnataka [2003] 6 SCC 697 (para 20) followed.
Cases
referred to
Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka [1992] 2 SCC 666
(para 7), Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka
[2003] 6 SCC 697 (para 8), Asstt. CIT v. Thanthi Trust [2001] 247
ITR 785/115 Taxman 126 (SC) (para 13), Brahmin Educational Society v. Asstt.
CIT [1997] 227 ITR 317/[1996] 89 Taxman 434 (Ker.) (para 14), CIT v.
Saraswati Poor Students Fund [1984] 150 ITR 142/[1985] 20 Taxman 211
(Kar.) (para 14), Aditanar Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT
[1997] 224 ITR 310/90 Taxman 528 (SC) (para 16), T. Devasahaya Nadar v. CIT
[1964] 51 ITR 20 (Mad.) (para 18), T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of
Karnataka [2002] 8 SCC 481 (SC) (para 20) and P.A. Inamdar v. State
of Maharashtra [2005] 6 SCC 537 (para 21).
Ravindra Chenji for the Appellant. D.D. Goyal for
the Respondent.